Comparative media analysis: why some fuzzy thinking might help. Applying fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to the personalization of mediated political communication by John Downey (1253652) & James Stanyer (1251939)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
 1 
Comparative Media Analysis: Why Some Fuzzy Thinking 
Might Help: Applying Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis to the Personalisation of Mediated Political 
Communication  
 
Abstract 
This article examines benefits of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
(fsQCA) for comparative media research. It shows the advantages of fuzzy 
set theoretic thinking in examining the causes of a major feature of 
contemporary political communication research, namely personalisation. The 
article has three parts. The first is a critique of the method adopted by Hallin 
and Mancini (2004), a generally laudable and highly influential recent 
contribution to comparative media analysis. The second is a brief introduction 
to fsQCA. The third demonstrates the method’s usefulness by investigating 
the personalised character of mediated political communication. 
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Introduction 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) have been rightly praised for their significant 
contribution to the field of comparative media analysis. What was once a 
neglected area in the field has become fashionable. Methodologically, 
however, comparative media analysis does not yet enjoy the maturity of 
comparative analysis found in other social sciences (for a similar criticism see 
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Livingstone, 2003). The development of comparative media analysis may be 
hastened by examining methodological developments in other fields to see 
what is potentially useful. In this article we contribute to this by working 
through one method developed and used in other social sciences, namely 
fuzzy set qualitative case analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2000; 2008a). The article 
has three parts. The first is a critique of Hallin and Mancini’s method which we 
take to be the state-of-the-art of comparative media analysis (see also Esser 
and Pfetsch, 2004). The second is a brief introduction to fsQCA geared 
towards why it is particularly useful for comparative media analysis. The third 
is to demonstrate this usefulness by investigating the personalised character 
of mediated political communication.  
 
The Methodological Impasse of Comparative Media 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) introduce their groundbreaking book on 
comparative media analysis by arguing for the importance of comparisons as 
a method. They make a number of claims. The first is that the field of 
communication has made little progress since the publication of Siebert et al. 
(1956) in explaining what should be the central question: why  do we have the 
media we have. This is a damning indictment of the field. The second is that  
much  existing comparative media analysis is ethnocentric, taking North 
American  or Western European media as either normative models of what 
media systems ought to be like or making invalid generalisations about the 
character of media systems beyond the USA and Western Europe based on 
empirical analysis of a limited range of countries. While there are some 
notable and noble exceptions to this ethnocentricity, Hallin and Mancini’s 
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claim is difficult to refute (Park and Curran, 2000). They suggest that 
comparative analysis helps to get past  ethnocentricity when forming concepts 
(helping us to notice differences and through this making us aware of the 
geographical limitations of concepts and the importance of generalising 
prudently). Comparison also permits the testing of hypotheses about the 
relationship between media systems and economic, social, cultural and 
political factors.  
 
Hallin and Mancini argue that talk of independent and dependent variables 
and the imitation of natural science methods in media analysis has turned 
many media scholars away from the task of explanation. They contend, 
however, that it is not necessary to imitate natural sciences in order to use 
comparisons as a way of testing hypotheses and causal inferences. To show 
this they criticise an argument made by Jeffrey Alexander (1981) who 
explains the rise of journalistic professionalism in the USA in contrast to 
France through reference to the absence of working class parties and 
associated newspapers. Hallin and Mancini refute this by extending the 
comparison beyond the USA and France to show that there can be media 
systems with both a strong labour press and highly developed professionalism 
thus casting doubt on the idea that weak labour press produces journalistic 
autonomy. 
 
While Hallin and Mancini do not describe what they are doing here in these 
terms, they are engaged in set theoretic thinking. Let us re-describe what they 
do  in fsQCA terminology: they take the set of countries with high levels of 
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journalistic professionalism (the outcome, not ‘the dependent variable’) and 
then show that there are different subsets (one with weak labour press, one 
with strong labour press) of this outcome and conclude that other causal 
conditions (not ‘the independent variables’) must contribute to the outcome. 
Hallin and Mancini implicitly do set theoretic thinking but remain for want of an 
alternative vocabulary tied to the language of the ‘effects’ tradition of social 
scientific inquiry (independent and dependent variables, hypothesis testing, 
causal inference and so on). The argument in this article is that there is a 
better alternative, fsQCA, that offers an alternative to the imitation of natural 
sciences methods.  
 
Having given an example of how comparison can be used in ‘hypothesis 
testing’, Hallin and Mancini backtrack a little and say that their study is largely 
exploratory, more for concept formation than hypothesis testing and causal 
inference. They seek to develop a framework for analysis but do not test it. 
This is, to some extent, because of the problems of collecting comparative 
data across media systems. The problem unfortunately is that it is difficult to 
collect comparative data across countries not only because of the relative 
infancy of the field of comparative media but also because different data 
collecting bodies often collect their data in different ways not to mention 
differences in media institutions themselves. The position argued for here is 
that in the collection of data there will inevitably be gaps and differences that 
may preclude multivariate analysis. Such problems may effectively strangle 
the new born field of comparative media analysis at birth or stunt its growth 
through restricting it to small-n case studies.  They would do so if we were to 
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tie ourselves either to a ‘net effects’ mode of inquiry or to less systematic case 
study research (which is mostly what we have at present). To move beyond 
these alternatives, when comparing data we need to think along the lines of 
calibration rather than measurement, and causal conditions, causal 
configurations and causal complexity rather than a net effects analysis.  
 
Hallin and Mancini choose a most similar systems design (MSSD) for their 
research (see George and Bennett, 2005). They limit themselves to North 
America and Western Europe i.e. to cases they consider to be most similar. 
The logic lying behind MSSD is that one chooses cases where all but two of 
the variables are constant thus allowing one to conclude that it is the 
independent variable that causes changes in the dependent variable. While 
not claiming to demonstrate causality, Hallin and Mancini argue that the cases 
they choose share comparable economic development, political history, and 
culture. Political systems are posited as the independent variable with the 
type of media system as the dependent variable. 
 
The problem with both MSSD and its less commonly adopted methodological 
sibling, most different systems design (MDSD), is that they require variables 
to be crisp: present or not present, 0 or 1. Crisp sets, however, simply do not 
adequately reflect the complexities of states. If we think in this binary way 
then we either have to say, for example, that the levels of economic 
development of the USA, Sweden, and Greece are the same or very different 
from one another. Rather than a binary logic we need to employ fuzzy sets 
that allow us to calibrate membership of sets on a variety of possible scales. 
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Not only does this give us a more adequate reflection of what is actually the 
case but also it allows us to make comparisons across different types of 
states, economies, and so on. We do not have to choose either most similar 
or most different states but can compare both together and also choose states 
in the middle, as it were, for good measure.  
 
MSSD and MDSD share the problem of being monocausal. MSSD, for 
example, holds variables constant in order to identify the independent variable 
that causes the dependent variable. Many media scholars of a more 
qualitative methodological inclination have difficulty with such an approach in 
that they argue outcomes are determined by a number of causes and it is the 
configuration or recipe that is important. The problem with independent 
variables is that causes are not independent but interact. 
 
Now the point here is not to accuse Hallin and Mancini of crude analysis. 
They provide a sophisticated analysis that is extremely illuminating but it is ill 
served by MSSD. For want of an alternative they have to fit their analysis into 
the straightjacket of MSSD.  
 
Redesigning Comparative Media Analysis 
Charles Ragin’s work in developing fsQCA (1987, 2000, and 2008a,b) 
provides an alternative both to small-n qualitative analysis and to large-n 
quantitative analysis. He argues that fsQCA can be applied to small, medium 
and large-n and has a four distinct advantages over large-n correlational 
research. This is a necessarily brief, uncritical summary of fsQCA’s principles 
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for the purpose of introducing the method to media scholars as it has not been 
previously applied in media analysis. 
 
The first advantage is that while correlational thinking is symmetrical fsQCA is 
asymmetrical. The example Ragin uses is the investigation of the relationship 
between democracy and development. If one correlates democracy and 
development one finds a weak correlation because there are many less 
developed countries that are democracies. If one employs set theoretic 
thinking, however, one can see a very strong set theoretic relationship in that 
developed countries are a subset of democratic countries. This prompts the 
examination of what it is about developed countries that leads to democracy. 
That is not to say, of course, that there are not other causal paths to 
democracy taken by less developed countries. Correlational thinking in this 
case would, however, serve to obscure what it is about developed countries 
that fosters democracy unless it was accompanied by a cluster analysis. 
 
The second advantage is that fuzzy sets are based on calibration rather than 
measurement. Calibration, although widely used in natural sciences, is rarely 
used in social sciences because of the dominance of correlational thinking 
and its dependency on measurement. Calibration means that ‘scores must be 
interpreted according to external standards’(2008a: 8). These external 
standards are based on theoretical and substantive knowledge. One takes, 
therefore, a series of measurements on, for example, interval or ratio scales 
and calibrates them according to external standards. This can also be done 
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when measurements are not strictly comparable across cases and would thus 
prevent correlational analysis.  
 
MSSD employs crisp sets with a variable given a score of either 0 or 1, it is 
either absent or present. With fuzzy sets causal conditions can be 
calibrate(0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and so on). It would mean that we could recognise the 
differences between say the levels of economic development between Greece 
and the USA while placing them in a set of developed economies. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The third advantage is that while correlational thinking sees independent 
variables as independent from one another, with each variable having a 
discrete additive net effect, set theoretic thinking sees causal conditions 
working together as a ‘causal recipe’ to produce an outcome. It is the 
combination that it important. While there are methods of examining causal 
interaction via correlational thinking set theoretic approaches provide a simple 
and illuminating analysis of causal configurations. To go back to Hallin and 
Mancini this allows us to examine the interplay between different causal 
conditions (economic, historical, cultural, political) rather than place all of our 
causal eggs in one basket (in Hallin and Mancini’s case, the political system).  
 
The fourth advantage is that fsQCA allows for the analysis of causal 
complexity through counterfactual reasoning. It allows researchers to examine 
different causal recipes and the consistency and coverage of their outcomes. 
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This can be achieved through using truth tables that list the logically possible 
combinations of causal conditions and their relation to the outcome. The 
number of possible combinations is 2K where k is the number of causal 
conditions. If there were 5 causal conditions there would be, for example, 32 
possible causal combinations.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The fsQCA algorithm follows a process of simplification. It compares causal 
recipes that differ by only one causal condition and that have the same 
outcome. In such cases, the differing causal condition is said to be irrelevant 
to the outcome and the causal combination that produces the outcome can be 
simplified. 
 
It may be that different causal recipes or combinations lead to the same 
outcome (in this case, the outcome, weak class voting, is caused by a number 
of different recipes). One can calculate the ‘raw’ and ‘unique’ coverage of 
each causal recipe (the percentage of the outcome that each recipe explains 
when part of a subset of other recipes that produce the outcome and by itself). 
It may be that the same causal recipe leads to different outcomes. Here we 
can calculate the consistency of the causal recipe in producing the outcome. 
When the consistency is below a certain cut-off value, say 0.75, we can 
conclude that there is likely to be another causal condition at work that has 
not been considered in the analysis and that had it been considered would 
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have produced greater consistency. Ragin recommends a cut-off consistency 
value of 0.85. 
 
As well as examining complex combinations of causal conditions with real 
outcomes, fsQCA allows the researcher to engage in ‘thought experiments’ or 
counterfactual reasoning involving the ‘remainders’ (the causal recipes that do 
not yield a real empirical outcome) in order to achieve greater parsimony. 
Here it is assumed that the remainders would yield an outcome and are then 
matched with the real cases to produce greater parsimony (Ragin, 2008d: 13). 
Such reasoning has a long history in social science and is often implicit in 
argument (Weber, 1949). Counterfactual reasoning can lead to the discovery 
of more parsimonious causal recipes that have similar levels of consistency 
and coverage to more complex recipes. Social scientists often find more 
parsimonious solutions attractive. 
 
Some remainders are more plausible than others in the sense that they  have 
causal recipes that fit in with theory and substantive knowledge about what 
causes the outcome. If we permit all remainders, we will find the most 
parsimonious solution but it will involve ‘difficult’ counterfactuals in the sense 
that it would include causal combinations that may contradict existing theory 
and knowledge of the causes of the outcome. As well as allowing for the most 
complex and the most parsimonious solution, fsQCA allows for intermediate 
solutions by considering solutions that contain the causal conditions of the 
most parsimonious solution and some of the conditions of the most complex 
solution. ‘Easy’ counterfactuals are those that fit in with existing theory and 
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knowledge of the outcome while difficult ones confound existing theory and 
knowledge. Ragin prefers the intermediate solution as it ‘strike(s) a balance 
between parsimony and complexity, based on the substantive and theoretical 
knowledge of the investigator’(2008a: 175). 
 
Personalised Political Communication: Causal Conditions and Recipes 
We have offered a brief critique of Hallin and Mancini’s comparative method 
and have suggested that Ragin’s fsQCA offers a number of clear advantages 
over existing approaches such as Most Similar and Most Different Systems 
Design. In the final part of the article this will be demonstrated by taking as a 
case study an important issue, the personalised character of political 
communication. 
 
There has been a growing interest in the personalised nature of contemporary 
politics across a range democracies (for a synoptic account see McAllister, 
2007). In the field of political communication research has largely 
concentrated on the extent to which media output is focused on politicians 
rather than institutions, organisations, or policies.  Plasser and Lengauer 
(2008) define personalisation as ‘an increasing focus on candidates at the 
expense of their parties or even policy issues’ (2008: 257). In this context 
studies have provided a wealth of often contradictory evidence. Some have 
found evidence of personalised political communication (Dalton et al. 2000; 
Mughan 2000; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007). Others have observed that there is 
little evidence of a more personalised political communication (Lessinger and 
Holtz –Bacha, 2003). Clearly, in some democracies political communication is 
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more personalised than in others. The literature, however, has little to say 
about why this might be the case. As media scholars we might be tempted to 
give primacy to the media as the cause while political scientists, in contrast, 
may focus more on the character of political systems and political behaviour. 
To what extent is the level of personalised political communication the result 
of political or media conditions ? To what extent might it even be the product 
of  a combination of political and media conditions?  
 
Fuzzy sets 
Following fsQCA (Ragin, 2000, 2008a, b,c,d), we see a personalised political 
communication as a fuzzy set which democracies can be  members of to a 
varying degree. Drawing on Ragin, democracies might be full members, full 
non-members, but more likely than not, membership is not so black and white. 
Members might be, for example, more in than out or more out than in, that is, 
have some but not all of the features. Based on secondary sources many 
democracies sit in this middle ground exhibiting some features which 
generate membership but not others. It would be wrong to force them to fit 
into either a set of democracies with fully personalised mediated political 
communication or a set without. 
 
The first stage of the research was to allocate membership to the fuzzy set 
democracies with  personalised mediated political communication, in other 
words, democracies where media output is more focused on politicians rather 
than institutions, organisations, or policies. The study deliberately identified a 
broad range of democracies with both shared and different characteristics. 
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This list included presidential and parliamentary systems; established and 
consolidating democracies; developed and developing countries; and 
countries with different kinds media systems. A total of 20 democracies were 
examined. Of course such a selection process could said to be biased but 
such criticisms bedevil all small-n comparative work (see Ebbinghaus, 2005: 
149).  
 
Each of the 20 democracies was then given a score between 0 and 1 
according to their membership of democracies with  personalised mediated 
political communication.1, indicated full membership of the set, 0, full non-
membership, 0.7, more in than out, and 0.3, more out than in. Calibration of 
membership scores is the most important but perhaps the most difficult 
process. Ideally, we would have used data from a content analysis of all 
national mediated political output for democracies around the world, but such 
a source does not exist. Indeed, there are few comprehensive cross-national 
studies of personalization of mediated political communication. Given the 
known difficulty of such studies, the likelihood of one existing in the near 
future is also remote. This though should not present an insurmountable 
barrier to comparative research. As noted, set membership can be calibrated  
‘according to external standards’(2008a: 8) which are based on the theoretical 
and substantive knowledge. In other words, the researcher, rather like a 
detective, can determine set membership based on theoretical and 
substantive knowledge. This act is, of course, fundamentally interpretive but 
this is one its strengths (see Ragin, 2000: 166). The process of calibration 
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enables systematic comparative research to take place in areas where full 
data sets are not always available.  
 
To determine the extent of personalised mediated political communication the 
authors drew on comparative studies, and on a range of nationally focused 
articles and book chapters. Given the number of countries involved acquiring 
detailed knowledge presented quite a challenge. The authors used these 
secondary sources to determine what it would take to gain full set 
membership, at what point countries would be full non-members and the 
cross over point where a country could be considered more out than in. 
 
Due to the nature of the data the study adopted an indirect method of 
calibration. This approach involved an initial sorting of cases, the assignment 
of preliminary set membership scores to each case based on secondary 
sources and then a further refining of the scores (see Ragin, 2008b). The 
study settled on several measures to produce a comprehensive picture of the 
extent to which mediated political communication was personalised. First, was 
the presence of leadership or candidate debates on television during elections. 
This was determined with data taken from Plasser with Plasser (2002: 190). 
Second, was the national prominence of leadership selection. In some 
democracies the process by which leaders are selected is a public media 
event, in other democracies leaders are chosen exclusively by the 
parliamentary party or by national convention or other closed means. One 
may plausibly suggest that where the selection process is open, the process 
and the actors are more likely to be discussed in the media, the US 
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presidential primaries being a case in point. Leadership selection was 
determined with data taken from Scarrow et al. (2000). The final measure was 
based on national research on media content some of which focused on 
election campaigns, and the extent to which that content was more focused 
on personalities (Campus and Pasquino, 2006; Dalton et al.,2000; Johansson, 
2008; Maniago, 2007; Mughan, 2000; Muir, 2005; Musialowska, 2008; Neveu, 
2005; Plasser and Lengauer 2008; Reineman, and Wilke, 2007). On these 
three factors each of the 20 democracies was given a score between 0 and 
50 according to the factors presence or absence. These scores were then 
combined to form an overall measure of personalised political communication. 
Countries with a  score of 130 and over out of 150 were considered full 
members, those democracies with a score of 50 or less were considered fully 
out, and the point of maximum ambiguity, or the cross over point, was set at 
90. Each democracies was then given one of the following scores, 1, 
indicating  a full membership of the set, 0 full non-membership, 0.7, more in 
than out, and 0.3, more out than in (see table 3).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Causal recipes 
Having allocated membership scores the authors then wanted to explore the 
causal conditions for membership and the different combinations of causal 
conditions – or causal recipes - which generate membership. One of the 
strengths of the fuzzy set approach is that it allows the exploration of complex 
combinations of causal conditions. So, for example, a key causal condition for 
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membership, as identified by others, might be membership of the set of 
democracies with a presidential system. Directly electing leaders might be a 
key causal condition but, of course, the nature of presidential systems vary 
and it may only be significant if countries are also full or partial members of 
the set of democracies with weak public service media and with a large 
tabloid media sector. A vigorous well developed commercial media system 
might well be necessary for full membership for a particular democracy. It 
might also be that having a vigorous commercial media system with a strong 
tabloid media sector combined with low party identification amongst voters will 
be sufficient for a country to be a full member without necessarily being a 
presidential democracy. To emphasize, it is different combinations of 
conditions working together that is the significant factor here not the discrete 
net effects of any one cause. Different combinations might lead to the same 
outcome and similar recipes to different outcomes. 
 
The authors explored a range of causal conditions drawing up a long-list of 
likely conditions before reducing them down to a final list of five. Membership 
of each causal subset was calibrated drawing on general resource books, 
edited collections, as well as a range of nationally focused articles and book 
chapters. 
 
The first condition selected was the degree of membership of the set 
presidential democracies. It is often argued that a more personalised style of 
politics is evident in democracies where the national leader is directly elected 
rather than in a parliamentary system where voters choose a party or parties 
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to govern. Membership of the set “democracies with directly elected 
presidents” was established with data from Blais and Massicotte (2002: 42) 
and Plasser with Plasser (2002). Countries where presidents were directly 
elected were considered full members, countries where presidents were not 
directly elected or were parliamentary democracies were considered full non-
members. Due to the crisp nature of this data there was no point of maximum 
ambiguity (see table 4 for membership scores). 
 
Observations about the personalisation of political communication are not 
confined to presidential democracies. Another factor shaping media output 
might be the slick media management and a greater focus on politicians’ 
personal image all features of professionalised campaigning. To measure 
membership of the set “democracies with professionalized campaigns” the 
study drew on findings from a global survey of political consultants by Plasser 
with Plasser and from a range of national case studies (see edited collections 
Johnson, 2008; Negrine et al., 2007; Schafferer, 2006; Voltmer, 2006). Set 
membership was determined by several measures; the use of external 
consultants and campaign research, and the results of a survey of 
international consultants asking whether image is more important than issues 
in a range of national election campaigns (Plasser with Plasser, 2002). Each 
democracy was given a score between 0 and 50 on each measure. Countries 
were considered full members if  they gained a score of 130 or more, full non-
members if their score was 50 or less and the cross over point was set at 90 
(see table 4 for membership scores). 
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Another condition might be the extent to which a democracy has weak public 
service media. Studies tend to suggest that with a weak public service media 
there is greater potential that political output will focus on personality rather 
than process (see Habermas 2006: 423). Membership of the set “weak public 
service media” was determined drawing on data from Hallin and Macini, 2004 
and from other sources (see edited collections Atkinson and Raboy, 1997; 
Park and Curran, 2000). Countries were considered full members if public 
service broadcasting audience share was 5% or less, full non-members if 
public service broadcasting audience stood at 45% or more, and the cross 
over point was set at the 25% audience share level (see table 4 for 
membership scores). 
 
Another condition shaping output might be the extent to which a democracy 
has an established and/or growing tabloid media sector. Research in media 
studies shows that countries with an established and growing tabloid media 
outlets are more likely to see intrusion into politicians’ private lives on a 
regular basis (see edited collection Stanyer and Wring, 2004). To gauge 
membership to the set “large tabloid media sector” the study used data from 
World Press Trends 2008 on newspapers and magazines around the world 
supplemented with data drawn from national case studies (see Qunito De 
Jesus, 2007; Sparks and Tulloch, 2000). Countries were considered full 
members if they had 80 or more tabloid outlets, full non-members if there 
were 10 or fewer tabloid outlets, and the cross over point was set at 40 (see 
table 4 for membership scores). 
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The final condition potentially shaping media output was audiences. More 
personalised political communication might be the result of media adaptation 
to the increasing importance of personal qualities in the mind of the voter-
audience. Indeed, studies have shown that candidate’s personal qualities are 
an important factor shaping electoral choice (see Clarke et al., 2004; Miller et 
al., 1986). While there is no comprehensive data set on personal voting 
patterns there is data on the level of party identification amongst voters. Low 
and declining levels of party identification might mean other factors, such as 
the personal qualities of those being elected, are important in determining the 
outcome of elections. Evidence of the level of party identification was drawn 
from data provided by Plasser with Plasser, 2002 and supplemented by 
information from Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000;  Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995 
and from a range of national case studies (see Dalton and Burklin, 2003; 
Canache, 2002; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2007). Countries were considered full 
members if 90% of eligible voters surveyed did not identify with a political 
party, full non-members if 10% or less identified and the cross over point was 
set at 50% of the voting population (see table 4 for membership scores). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Explaining the Personalisation of Political Communication 
FsQCA software was used to produce a variety of truth tables that show 
which causal combinations lead to which outcomes (software available at: 
www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/ ). What is presented next are the complex, 
parsimonious and intermediate solutions or causal recipes that lead to the 
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personalisation of political communication.1 In these tables capital letters 
indicate the presence of causal conditions while lower case letters indicate the 
absence of causal conditions. Table 5 (below) shows three different complex 
causal recipes that produce personalisation of political communication. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The first two complex causal recipes in table 5 include the same 4 causal 
conditions, the only simplification being the absence of professionalization as 
a causal condition. It would appear that whether professionalization is present 
or not is not significant in explaining the personalisation of political 
communication. In the first recipe the presence of a presidential system 
together with low party identity and the absence of tabloid media and weak 
public service produces personalisation. In the second causal recipe we have 
the presence of all four causal conditions. This raises the question of the 
relevancy of tabloid media and weak public service as causal conditions. 
When presidential systems and low party identification are present as causal 
conditions the outcome is the same irrespective of the presence or absence of 
tabloid media and weak public service. The third complex causal recipe 
shows that the presence of low party identification, professionalization, and 
tabloid media and the absence of presidential systems and weak public 
service produces personalisation. 
 
If we now turn to more parsimonious solutions using all remainders i.e. both 
easy and difficult counterfactuals. Table 6 shows that the presence of a 
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presidential system alone can explain the outcome of personalisation with a 
consistency of below 0.75 (below the 0.85 recommended by Ragin). This low 
level of consistency means that being a presidential system on it own is not 
enough and another causal condition needs to be considered as well. An 
alternative parsimonious recipe would be the presence of low party identity 
and an established tabloid media, that explains the outcome with a high level 
of consistency. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 7 below presents intermediate solutions, based on the assumptions that 
the presence of all of the causal conditions should contribute to 
personalisation (thus permitting only ‘easy’ counterfactuals). 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
These intermediate solutions suggest that there are two different paths to the 
personalisation of political communication and media institutions play a 
different role in each causal path. The first causal path is where a democracy 
has a presidential system plus low party identification. Here it is very likely 
that political communication will be personalised irrespective of whether there 
is tabloid media or weak public service i.e. media institutions do not appear to 
be a determining factor in the production of personalised political 
communication. It is much more a question of political systems and culture 
that drives the personalisation of political communication rather than media 
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institutions. This though is not ‘necessary’ condition for the personalisation of 
political communication. Personalisation is not, for example, dependent upon 
there being a presidential system. We can see this if we examine the second 
causal path. Mediated political communication is also personalised in 
democracies  where party identification is low, campaigns are 
professionalized, and there is a strong tabloid media. In this case, the 
presence or absence of presidential systems is irrelevant. Where we have low 
party identification together with professionalised campaigns and tabloid 
media we have personalisation in both presidential and parliamentary 
democracies. In these cases the presence of tabloid media is partly 
responsible for personalisation but note that it is responsible as part of a 
recipe, a combination of conditions, rather than on its own as an independent 
variable. 
 
What light can this shed on our question concerning how to explain the 
personalisation of mediated political communication. The first thing to say is 
that there are different answers (because there are different causal recipes) to 
the question depending on the character of the political system concerned. 
Where the political system is a presidential system and characterised by low 
party identification, it appears that this is sufficient to cause the 
personalisation of political communication. This is can be seen in the US,  and 
in many Latin American, Eastern European and East Asian democracies. 
Media factors appear to be irrelevant if these two political causes are present. 
The media system is off-the-hook as it were in terms of being responsible for 
the personalisation of political communication in such democracies.  
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The media system can contribute to personalisation in certain circumstances. 
Where the country has merely low party identification, then it appears a large 
tabloid media contributes to the personalisation of political communication. 
We can see this  in parliamentary democracies, such as the UK, with a strong 
tabloid newspaper sector. Here we find that it is the combination of political 
and media factors that cause the personalisation of political communication. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article was threefold. First, to highlight the relatively 
undeveloped nature of comparative media research, both methodologically 
and empirically and point out the weaknesses of some current approaches. 
Second, to introduce briefly the central tenets of fsOCA that can help to 
address such weaknesses . Third, to demonstrate this through applying 
fsQCA to a key issue in political communication. Such an approach instead of 
seeing discrete net effects of independent variables reveals, via fuzzy set 
truth tables, more or less complex, more or less parsimonious  ‘causal 
recipes’ that produce an outcome. Fuzzy sets allow us to draw finer 
distinctions between case studies while maintaining the power of comparative 
analysis. The example of personalisation shows that such an approach can 
yield simple yet illuminating solutions and analysis. The analysis suggests that 
there are two causal paths to personalisation of political communication: one 
where the make-up of political institutions is predominant causally (particularly 
the presence of presidential systems) and the character of media institutions 
is relatively unimportant; another where a combination of political culture and 
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media conditions explains personalisation irrespective of whether the political 
system is parliamentary or presidential. Such analysis suggests that if we 
wish to understand the personalisation of mediated political communication 
comprehensively then we should consider the complex causal combinations 
of political and media conditions and the different paths towards 
personalisation. We should eschew a one size fits all approach as there are 
different paths to personalisation. We should also avoid either a politico-
centric or a media-centric approach and examine a variety of political and 
media conditions and the interaction of these conditions rather than seek to 
isolate the discrete effects of independent variables.
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Table 1: Crisp versus Fuzzy Sets 
Crisp set 3-value 
Fuzzy set 
4-value 
Fuzzy set 
6 value 
Fuzzy set 
‘Continuous’ 
Fuzzy set 
1=fully in 1=fully in 1=fully in 1=fully in 1=fully in 
    0.9 
   0.8=mostly in 0.8 
  0.67=more in 
than out 
 0.7 
   0.6=more in 
than out 
0.6 
 0.5=neither 
fully in nor 
out 
  0.5=maximum 
ambiguity 
   0.4=more out 
than in 
0.4 
  0.33=more 
out than in 
 0.3 
   0.2=mostly 
out 
0.2 
    0.1 
0=fully out 0=fully out 0=fully out 0=fully out 0=fully out 
 
Adapted from Ragin (2008a:31) 
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Table 2: Fuzzy set data on class voting in advanced industrial societies 
 
Country Weak 
Class 
Voting 
(W) 
Affluent 
(A) 
Income 
Inequality 
(I)  
Manufact 
uring (M) 
Strong 
Unions 
(U) 
Australia 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.6 
Belgium 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.8 
Denmark 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 
France 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 
Germany 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 
Ireland 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 
Italy 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Netherlands 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Norway 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Sweden 0 0.8 0.4 0.8 1 
UK 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 
USA 1 1 0.8 0.4 0.2 
 
(Ragin, 2008a: 127) 
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Table 3: Membership of the Fuzzy Set ‘Democracies with Personalised 
Political Communication’ 
 
Country Personalised Political 
Communication 
Argentina 0.7 
Australia 0.3 
France 0.7 
Germany 0.3 
Greece 0.3 
Hungary 0 
India 0 
Italy 0.7 
Mexico 0.7 
New Zealand 0.3 
Philippines  0.7 
Poland  0.7 
Russia 0.7 
South Africa 0 
Spain 0.3 
Sweden 0.3 
Taiwan 0.7 
UK 0.7 
USA 1 
Venezuela 0.7 
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Table 4: Causal Conditions for Membership of Fuzzy Set ‘Democracies 
with Personalised Political Communication’ 
 
Country Personali
sed  
Presi 
System 
Low Pty 
Identity 
Profess 
isation 
Tabloid 
Media 
Weak 
PSB 
Argentina 0.7 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Australia 0.3 0 0.7 1 0.3 0 
France 0.7 1 0.7 1 0 0 
Germany 0.3 0 0.3 1 0.7 0 
Greece 0.3 0 0.3 0.7 1 1 
Hungary 0 0 0.7 0.7 0 0.7 
India 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 
Italy 0.7 0 0.3 0.7 0.3 0 
Mexico 0.7 1 1 0.7 1 1 
New 
Zealand 
0.3 0 0.7 1 .3 0 
Philippines  0.7 1 0.7 0.3 0.7 1 
Poland  0.7 1 1 0.3 0.7 0.7 
Russia 0.7 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
South Africa 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 
Spain 0.3 0 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 
Sweden 0.3 0 0.3 1 1 0 
Taiwan 0.7 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 
UK 0.7 0 0.7 1 1 0 
USA 1 1 0.7 1 1 1 
Venezuela 0.7 1 0.7 .3 0.7 0.7 
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Table 5: Complex Causal Solutions for the Personalisation of Political 
Communication 
 
Causal Recipe Consistency 
PRESSSYS*LWPTYIDENT*tabloid media*wkpublic service 1 
PRESSSYS*LWPTYIDENT*TABLOID 
MEDIA*WKPUBLICSERVICE 
0.941176 
pressys* LWPTYIDENT*PROFESSIONALIZE* TABLOID 
MEDIA* wkpublic service 
1 
The raw and unique coverage scores for the first recipe are: 0.265306; 0.112245. For the 
second recipe are: 0.489796; 0.336735. For the third recipe: 0.255102; 0.255102. 
 
 
Table 6: Parsimonious Solutions for the Personalisation of Political 
Communication 
 
Causal recipe Consistency 
PRESSYS 0.733333 
LWPTYIDENT*TABLOIDMEDIA 0.963855 
The raw and unique coverage scores for the first recipe are: 0.673469; 0.142857. For the 
second recipe are: 0.816327; 0.285714.  
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Table 7:  Intermediate Solutions for the Personalisation of Political 
Communication 
 
Causal recipe Consistency 
PRESSSYS*LWPTYIDENT 0.875000 
TABLOIDMEDIA* PROFESSIONALIZE*LWPTYIDENT 1 
The raw and unique coverage scores for the first recipe are: 0.642857; 0.234694. For the 
second recipe are: 0.693878;  0.285714.  
 
                                            
1
 For the sake of space we have focused solely on the consistency of each recipe and have 
not discussed the ‘raw’ and ‘unique’ coverage scores. These scores can be found in the 
footnotes to tables 5,6, and 7. 
